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INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this study is to evaluate the effects of
self-esteem stress upon the perceptions of self and of others.
To ascertain these effects, two groups of subjects, matched
on the basis of manifest anxiety level, sorted statements re-
ferring to perceptions of themselves and of others. The
members of one group had been informed that they were malad-
justed and the other group members had been advised that they
were more or less normal. The sortings were based on a
graduated dimension indicating how well these statements
described the subject's conceptions of their own selves and
of others.
How the individual reacts to self-esteem stress in his
perceptions of self and of others has been recently investi-
gated (16, 5, 8, 7, 19) . Very little research has been
conducted where the anxiety level of the subjects has been
controlled, to ascertain how stress affects self perceptions
and perceptions of others. For some of the theoretical
formulations, the writer turned to two clinical-personality
theorists who have made the self and its perceptions a central
part of their approach to behavior. Sullivan, for example,
indicates that one part of the personality (or in his terras,
the self-system) evolves in order to secure the necessary
satisfactions of living and to secure these satisfactions
without incurring too much anxiety (35) • Behavioral tendencies
develop whose purpose is to reduce or minimize anxiety. Upon
the basis of theoretical formulations (31^, 35) ancl empirical
2support (12), self-esteem stress presumably evokes anxiety
which the stressed individual attempts to minimize.
When perceptions of the self and of others are called
for at the time the individual is exposed to self-esteem
stress, it is presumed that these perceptions will be influ-
enced by operations to avoid and reduce anxiety. According
to Sullivan, the individual attempts to keep out of his aware-
ness, implications or meanings about himself that may lead to
a lowering in his self-esteem. Hence, there may be greater
focusing by the stressed individual upon the more favorable
aspects of the self. In addition, in the theoretical system
of Sullivan, the anxiety that is ostensibly aroused by self-
esteem stress is usually converted into hostility. Hence,
it is likely that the individual will have a more unfavorable
view of others. In support of this, Sullivan adds that where
there is much anxiety connected with one f s own view of the
self, there is then present the attitude of disparaging others.
Next the question is asked whether differences in manifest
anxiety are related to the perceptions of self and others. In
conformity with Sullivan 1 s theory, the greater the manifest
anxiety of the individual, the greater the need will be to
maintain his current self perceptions. Sullivan indicates
that people who are highly anxious and suffer a great deal,
are utterly convinced that they need no change and are very
resistant to new information about themselves. Hence, when
high anxious individuals are exposed to disparaging but reli-
able information about themselves, they will be less likely
to include this information in their pictures of themselves.
Having established a tenuous adjustment to himself, the high
anxious person will be loath to attempt any changes that may
disturb this adjustment.
It is the author's belief too that the high anxious indi-
vidual will have less favorable perceptions than the low
anxious individual. At this point it should be indicated that
high and low anxious individuals are identified by means of
the Taylor anxiety scale (36). Upon examining the content of
this scale, the writer is impressed with one of its general
themes, namely, unfavorable views of the self. On this basis
he can indicate that the high anxious individual is inclined
to perceive himself relatively unfavorably. But again, one
must contend with his presumed need to maintain his adjustment
in the face of experiences that are damaging to his self-
esteem. His change in self perception, then, should be much
less than the change evoked in the low anxious individual who
is also faced *;ith self-esteem stress. The author agrees
with Sullivan that we all try to avoid unfavorable changes in
our personality and that the high anxious individual is deter-
mined in this attempt.
Rogers has also made the self and its perceptions a
central part of his approach to behavior (25). According to
Rogers, the self, which is the nuclear concept in his theory,
has the following properties: 1) it develops out of the indi-
vidual's interactions .with his environment; 2) it introjects
the values of other people; 3) it strives for consistency;
it perceives experiences which are not consistent with the
preferred view of the self as threats; 5) it denies or distorts
these threats. Thus Rogers postulates that It is the self
which secures the necessary gratifications of living and workB
to gain these satisfactions with minimal anxiety involved.
Rogers Is of the opinion that threatening experiences will
very often not be synthesized as part of the individual »s self-
concept. He states that under threat or stress, the person's
organization of self becomes more rigid and accepts less and
less of those experiences which are perceived as threatening.
The threatened individual may consequently perceive himself
more favorably than the individual whose self-concept is not
threatened. Yet the person obviously cannot completely dis-
regard these threatening factors of his environment, and thus
in many cases these experiences may be expressed In indirect
fashion, such as vague apprehensions and psychosomatic com-
plaints. Hence, the high anxious person may be expected to
report more maladjustment of a general nature, e.g., general
feelings of inadequacy and apprehension. It is usually the
high anxious individual who has been exposed to threat quite
frequently. At the same time it is expected that this indi-
vidual would be less apt than a low anxious individual to
permit a threat to his self-esteem to affect his self-concept
.
Further, it is a basic tenet of Rogerian theory that the
perceptions of others, like those of the self grow out of the
organism^ interactions with his environment, i.e., as a
result of evaluational interactions with others. Rogers
postulates that when a person is able to accept into one con-
sistent and integrated system, all of his sensory and visceral
experiences, then he is able to be more understanding of others
and more accepting of them. A person who is defensive, accord-
ing to Rogers, is more apt to feel hostile and less accepting
toward others. It seems, according to Rogers, that the person
has not organized effective methods for meeting the needs of
the reality situation. The person dimly perceives discrepan-
cies in himself, but he is too rigid to allow an objective
evaluation of the experiences. Rather, vague feelings of
apprehension and visceral upset arise.
In empirical support for his theoretical postulations,
Rogers (26) found that in general, individuals who are suf-
ficiently dissatisfied with their personality structure to
request therapy, have certain characteristics in common. They
have a generalized negative attitude toward themselves, feel
more or less worthless, more anxious, less socially adequate,
and lack positive goals for their lives and find it difficult
to make decisions. At the same time, these highly anxious
persons are unaware of many inconsistencies within themselves.
They tend to judge experiences on an emotional level rather
than on an objective one, and often deny to their awareness,
certain attitudes which are inconsistent with their self-
structure, and which are therefore anxiety provoking.
Rogers reports that the successful therapy case on the
other hand, views himself in a more positive fashion, with more
objective feelings about the self rather than emotional ones.
He becomes more accepting of self and permits more experiential
data to enter awareness. Objective data which may be threaten-
ing to his self-esteem are nevertheless symbolized and made
part of his self picture. It is possible that to the extent
the individual is made less anxious by psychotherapy, to that
extent is he able to tolerate reliable information that is
threatening and to make considerable changes in his self
picture.
Perception and stress ; In an attempt to test the Rogerian
hypothesis that the individual becomes rigid as a protective
measure under stress, Combs and Taylor (6) studied the sub-
jects ability to transform sentences into code under two
different types of sentences: Those threatening to the self,
and neutral sentences. The results supported Rogers' theory;
the threatening sentences took longer to code, and resulted in
more errors. Eruner and Postman (2) found that words repre-
senting some personal threat, tended to be perceived either
more quickly or more slowly than neutral words, whereas words
representing positive values were perceived at shorter inter-
vals. Hanfman (11) feels that this slow perception may serve
a defensive function of blocking out the potentially dangerous
environment. She feels the alternative quick perception of
threat may represent an alerting effect of lesser degrees of
anxiety; on the other hand, it may be concomitant of acute
anxiety which appears when the defenses break down.
Kates (16) endeavored to induce one group of subjects to
view themselves favorably by advising them that they were well
adjusted, while in another group of Ss he induced a less
favorable self-regard by advising that they were poorly ad-
justed. The measure of change in the subjects' conceptualiza-
tion of themselves was their ratings of the disturbance values
7of annoying social situations. It was assumed, if these
annoying social situations were evaluated as significantly
less disturbing by Ss who were advised that they were well
adjusted, then it could be concluded that their self
-conceptu-
alization had been favorably altered, A similar assumption
in the reverse direction was made for those Ss who were told
they were poorly adjusted. Significant differences were
found between the two ratings made by the "well adjusted"
experimental group, i.e., those subjects who were advised
that they were well adjusted did evaluate annoying social
situations as less disturbing than prior to such advisement.
The "poorly adjusted" experimental group and the control group
did not change relative to the "well adjusted" group. Kates
concluded that subjects, when described as well adjusted by
others, will conceptualize themselves favorably; these con-
ceptualizations probably include feelings of power in social
relations.
For the fact that those Ss advised as poorly adjusted did
not change in their ratings of social situations, Kates offers
alternative solutions. They may have conceptualized themselves
unfavorably, but did not permit these unfavorable conceptu-
alizations to affect their evaluations of annoying social
situations. The second alternative is that the Ss did not
conceptualize themselves unfavorably because they had either
rejected or distorted such descriptions. Since there was no
change in their conceptualizations of themselves, the Ss did
not revise their evaluations of annoying social situations.
Following Rogers (25) and Snygg and Combs (32), Chodorkoff (5)
describes defensiveness as primarily a perceptual phenomenon
which follows as a consequence of threat to the individuals
self. As a result of threat, aspects of the individual* s en-
vironment and of the person himself may be denied to awareness
or be misperceived. By this means, the individual is able to
insure the stability of his self, Defensiveness in perception
of the self was studied by means of a Q sort of self-descriptive
statements, Defensiveness in terms of the environment was
studied by means of the tachistoscopic presentation of neutral
words and personally relevant threatening words.
In an experiment split into three sessions, the subjects
completed a biographical inventory, were administered a word
association test and thematic apperception test and then were
given a perceptual defense procedure. The words in the word
association test with the longest reaction times, i.e., those
words regarded as having emotional impact, and those words
having the shortest reaction times, or neutral words, were
used in the perceptual defense procedure. Following this
procedure, the S performed a Q, sort of cards with instructions
to sort them to describe himself.
Here, the author wishes to make an explanatory note re-
garding abbreviations which will be utilized from time to
time throughout this report. TAT will refer to the thematic
apperception test. HA and LA will refer to subjects who are
high and low in manifest anxiety respectively. MAS will refer
to the Taylor manifest anxiety scale. Finally, MMPI will
refer to the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory.
The biographical inventory, Rorschach, word association
test and TAT were interpreted by judges, and then the Q sort
items were sorted by judges to describe the S as they saw him.
Chodorkoff made the following hypotheses:
1. The greater the agreement between the individual 1 s
self description and an objective description of him, the less
perceptual defense he will show.
2. The greater the agreement between the individual's
self description and an objective description of him, the more
adequate will be his personal adjustment.
3. The more adequate the personal adjustment of the in-
dividual, the less perceptual defense he will show.
All three hypotheses were supported. In addition,
Chodorkoff found that eleven Ss were able to recognize the
threatening words more quickly than the neutral words. Ten
of these eleven Ss were among the fifteen who had the highest
accuracy of self-description scores, and eight of the eleven
were among the fifteen Ss with the highest adjustment scores.
Chodorkoff suggests the following formulation: the better
adjusted individual attempts to obtain mastery over threatening
situations by getting to know, as quickly as possible, what it
is that is threatening. The more poorly adjusted individual,
on the other hand, may try to keep the threat from becoming
adequately symbolized.
Levanway (19) studied the effect of stress on expressed
attitudes toward self and others. He referred to studies
(2l\., 29, 33) in which there was general agreement that clients
who were judged to have made progress in therapy increased the
number of positive statements and decreased the number of
negative statements they made about themselves and others
during the course of therapy. Levanway assumes that since
one measure of progress in therapy is the client's reported
experiencing of less stress, this suggests that reduction in
stress is associated with the expression of more favorable
attitudes toward self and others. Carrying this thought
further, Levanway assumes that experimentally increasing the
amount of stress should effect a lowered evaluation of self
and others. However, a pilot study gave results in the
opposite direction.
To test this further, the author administered a series
of tasks to subjects in a pre-stress phase} the tasks were
self-rating, rating of others and a picture sorting task.
In the stress phase, individual subjects were given a series
of word lists to memorize and recall, following which they
were stressed by the experimenter who told them that the
pattern of words in their recall was indicative of emotional
conflict. Immediately following stress, the Ss were given
the same three tasks as in the pre-stress phase. In line
with the results of his pilot study, Levanway predicted that
following the introduction of stress, Ss would a) express
liking for more pictures of people; b) rate others more
favorably and c) make significant changes in their self -ratings
All these hypotheses were supported at the .01 level of
confidence. A secondary finding was a positive correlation
between self-ratings and ratings of others, both before
stress (.Ik) and after stress conditions (.77). These results
then are in direct contradiction to what one would expect on
the basis of previous studies. Levanway suggests two alter-
native explanations. In the previous studies, all Ss were
in therapy. This was not the case in his study and this
difference in experimental subjects may account for the con-
tradictory results. Levanway suggests that the more signifi-
cant fact may be that changes in attitudes about self and
others were responsible for changes in the degree of stress
perceived. If this were the case, then there is no essential
contradiction between the results of this study and the
previous ones.
These results are, however, not out of line with the
theories of Rogers and Sullivan regarding the defensive
behavior of an individual under stress. One will recall that
Rogers suggests that threatening experiences will very often
not be synthesized as part of the individuals self-concept
.
He states that under threat, the individual's organization of
the self becomes more rigid and as a result he accepts less
and less of those experiences which are perceived as threat-
ening. Sullivan, on the other hand, theorized that when
perceptions of the self and of others are called for at the
time the individual is exposed to self-esteem stress, it Is
presumed that these perceptions will be influenced by certain
security operations. Presumably, the individual attempts to
keep out of his awareness, implications or meanings about
himself that may lead to a drop in his self-esteem.
In line with these theoretical explorations, Gerard
Haigh (12) studied the defensive behavior of patients who
were in client-centered therapy. The author assumed two
principles in formulating his overall hypothesis. One, that
the recognition by the client of acceptant counselor attitudes
should lead to a decrease in defensive behavior. The second
principle is that, as the client proceeds to explore himself
at deeper and deeper levels during the course of therapy, he
uncovers inconsistencies in himself while at the same time
he is working them through to a solution. Putting these two
principles together, Haigh expected that he would find a de-
crease in the frequency of defensive behavior during the course
of client-centered therapy. Haigh did in fact find this de-
crease to be significant at the 5 percent level of confidence.
Similarly, a proportional increase in awareness of defensive-
ness was found in the group showing a decrease in defensiveness.
Therefore, from this study it appears safe to conclude that
when a person's self-concept is under stress, he is more apt
to be defensive then when there is no stress. Thus, Levanway 1 s
finding that self acceptance went up following self-esteem
stress could find explanation in the theories of Rogers and
Sullivan, supported by Haigh 1 s findings.
Levanway 1 s finding of increased acceptance of others
following self-esteem stress, however, is not to be expected
from Sullivan 1 s theory. Sullivan hypothesized that the
anxiety aroused by self-esteem stress is converted into
hostility toward others and thus there should be a drop rather
than an increase in positive feelings toward others. This
finding would be likewise expected from Rogerian theory. It
is possible that either of Levanway 1 s alternative explanations
is sufficient, i.e., either a difference in experimental
sample, or that changes in the degree of stress perceived
were the results of changes in attitudes about self and
others rather than vice versa. In any case, this study will
attempt in part to throw further light on this question—to
determine whether or not this type of result is to be expected.
Leonard Diller (7), in an attempt to bring the self-
concept under more direct experimental attack than had
previously been the case, performed an experimental study in
which conscious and unconscious self-attitudes after success
and failure were studied. Pour main questions asked by
Diller were: 1. What are the effects of success and failure
on attitudes toward the self; 2. Is there any difference
between overt and covert behavior with regard to this problem;
3. What are the effects of success and failure on attitudes
toward others; !}.. Does the degree of closeness of the other
person to the self affect the extent of change in attitudes.
The overt attitudes of the subjects were measured by a seven-
point scale consisting of ten personality traits. Each S
rated himself and twelve friends on this scale. Covert
attitudes were measured by obtaining the S 1 s responses to
samples of handwriting presented to him in a disguised fashion.
On each occasion, one of the samples was his own. The subject
was asked to give a free personality description of each
sample, to rate each sample on the same seven-point rating
scale as used in obtaining overt attitudes, and to rank the
four samples in order of attractiveness.
Three groups of subjects were used: a success group, a
failure group and a control group. The control group merely
performed the overt and covert attitude measures on two
separate occasions. The success and failure groups were
administered an intelligence test between tasks, and, de-
pending upon the group they were in, were given a positive
or negative evaluation of their intelligence test results
prior to the second administration of the attitude scales,
Diller reports that, after failure, there were no sig-
nificant changes In self-ratings of intelligence nor in self-
ratings of the various personality traits on the overt scale.
There were also no significant changes In self-ratings of
intelligence on the covert scale, but there were significant
decreases on the covert scale In self-estimates of personality
traits. With regards the ratings of friends, no significant
changes on either the overt or covert scales were found.
After success, Diller found a significant rise in self
ratings on the overt rating scale of personality traits,
while on the covert side, no differences occurred. Ratings
of friends after success showed a significant rise in the
overt rating soale for the personality traits. However, no
changes were found in ratings of intelligence on the overt
scale, nor on either rating on the covert scale. Diller
concludes that changes which accompany self-esteem stress,
may be greater in aspects of personality which superficially
bear little resemblance to the valued trait with which stress
was concerned than In the rating of the valued trait. Diller
believes, that after a failure experience, the S who exhibits
no change in his overt attitudes while his covert attitudes
reflect diminished self-esteem, is defending the integrity
of his self image by concealing his attitude changes from the
examiner. Diller feels that this defense is a conscious one,
since the overt attitudes are under conscious control, while
the covert ones are not. The failure then to find changes in
the overt attitudes of the subjects was the result of their
conscious defenses.
Diller also concluded that the theory that attitudes
toward others covary with self-attitudes is substantiated
by the responses obtained from the success group where ratings
of all friends rose, and ratings of close and ordinary friends
changed more than did the ratings of casual acquaintances.
After failure, however, Diller found a reverse relationship—
i.e., after failure, an individual may either raise his self
esteem while lowering his evaluation of close friends or he
may lower his own self esteem while rating his friends higher.
Diller concluded then that the generalization or spread of
self attitudes to others does not occur after a failure ex-
perience. This latter result is in opposition to what one
would expect from Levanway's (19) results who, one will recall,
found that attitudes toward others as well as toward self,
were more favorable following self-esteem stress. Once
again, this study will attempt to clarify this apparent note
of contradiction.
Doris and Sarason (8) attempted to determine a) whether
the direction of blame assignment in a failure situation
varies with the level of anxiety of the testee, and b) with
repeated failure whether the groups differ in the constancy
with which they blame the self or other-than-3elf . Doris
and Sarason predicted that the high anxiety (HA) subjects
would blame themselves more In a failure situation than the
low anxiety (LA) subjects.
Subjects were selected on the basis of a test-anxiety
questionnaire. Each S was presented with eight performance
items taken from various standard intelligence scales. The
situation was so arranged that S woula pass four and fail
four of the tests. After success or failure on a test, S
was asked to rank in order of their relevance, some items
that might have contributed to his success or failure as the
case might be. The authors selected items that would express
blame for failure either toward the self or toward the examiner
and the testing situation. The results showed a significant
difference between HA and LA on their mean self-blame score
for one order of presentation of the test items, but not for
the reverse order. The main hypothesis, however, was sup-
ported, i.e., HA Ss did tend to blame self more than the LA,
although this was upheld on only one order of presentation
of the test items. Hence, HA Ss may blame themselves more
frequently and have less favorable self concepts.
Relation between acceptance of self and acceptance of
others t The theories of Sullivan and Rogers postulate that
there is a relationship between how a person perceives himself
and how he perceives others. Both theorists point out that,
in general, when a person has positive attitudes toward
himself, he will in turn have positive attitudes toward
others, but when under stress, while the attitudes toward
self may remain positive due to defenses, the attitudes toward
others will be expected to be less positive. Levanway (19),
it will be recalled, did not find this to be the case. In a
study of this relationship at the Counseling Center at
Chicago, Sheerer (29) found that over the course of therapy,
there was a marked and fairly regular increase in the
measured acceptance of and respect for self. There was also
a marked, but more uneven, rise in the acceptance of others
from the beginning to the end of therapy. Sheerer also con-
cluded that the correlation between attitudes toward the
self and toward others was "definite and substantial" (p.l7lj.).
In a parallel study at Chicago, Dorothy Stock (33) in-
vestigated the interrelations between the self concept and
feelings toward other persons and groups. Using a Pearson
product-moment coefficient, and correlating only those inter-
views in which the number of statements on which the average
was based was greater than ten, Stock found a positive cor-
relation of .66. Stock concluded that the results indicate
that a positive relationship exists between the way a person
feels about himself and the way he feels about others. She
points out that an Individual who holds negative feelings
toward himself tends to hold similar feelings toward others,
and his feelings about himself change to objective or positive,
feelings about others change in a similar direction.
Studies in support of these conclusions were done by
Berger (1) and Orawake (22) who concluded that there is a
positive relationship between the way a person feels about
himself and the way he feels about others. This study will
attempt to throw further light on this question, relating the
variables of stress and anxiety.
The measures—SIO Adjustment Scale t In this study, the
perception of self and others will be operationally defined
by the adjustive scale of the SIO sort as developed by Rogers
and Dymond (26)
.
These authors reported very significant
changes in attitudes of patients toward themselves and toward
others after therapy. The SIO method in evaluating these
changes was to have the subject perform a "Q" 3ort of himself
and of others. The rationale behind this method was the
Rogerian theory that "the self-concept consists of an organized
conceptual pattern of the »I» or the t rae* > together with
values attached to these concepts. This implies that many
single self-perceptions, standing in relation each to the
other, exist for the same individual. It is quite possible
for the individual to order these self -concepts along a sub-
jective or psychological continuum from 1 unlike -me 1 to
»like-rae»" (26 p.55).
In another report on the same project, Rudikoff (26, ch.3)
reported changes in the perceptions of others as well as the
self, the perception of the self, however, undergoing the
greatest change. Both changes were in a positive direction,
responding favorably to therapy.
In an attempt to study whether the changes in self-ideal
correlations over therapy were indicative of "real" improve-
ment or merely a change in the frame of reference, Dymond
(26, ch. 5) devised a "Q" sort adjustment scale to provide
an external criterion of adjustment level. This scale was
based on the SIO sort test devised by Rogers and Dymond. A
group of statements from the 310 sort was given to several
clinical psychologists who indicated those statements the
well-adjusted individual would say are like him, and those
he would say are unlike him. This selection resulted in 7U
"valid" items, 37 in the "well adjusted" category and 37 in
the "unadjusted" category. The S10 score included counting
adjustive items indicated as like the 3 and unadjusted items
marked unlike the S.
By means of this adjustment scale, it is believed that
we may be enabled to achieve an objective score respecting
the individual's attitudes toward himself and toward others.
Scores on this scale enable us to determine how well adjusted
the person perceives himself to be. This scale also allows
one to assess the subjects 1 perceptions of others in terms of
the favorability of their personal adjustment,
In her study relating the adjustment scale to gains made
in personal adjustment over therapy, Dymond found that the
therapy group at pretherapy were significantly less adjusted
than controls who did not request therapy. There was no
change in either group over a wait period of 60 days. However,
after therapy, the mean adjustment soore of the total experi-
mental group was significantly (.01) higher than it was at
pretherapy, and this improvement was maintained during a
follow-up period. There was not, however, a comparable
change in the control group over the same length of time.
The reliability of this scale was estimated by the test-
rotest method. Since the experimental group was expected to
change over time and the controls wore not, the reliability
was based on the stability of the control group. Dymond
reports that the adjustment scores of the control group from
post-therapy to follow-up had a reliability of .86. The
validity of the measure depends to a large degree on how
well this scale agrees with other measures of improvement on
which the subjects were tested. Dymond reports that the
rank-order correlation between the " " sort adjustment score
of two groups of twenty-three therapy subjects at pretherapy
was
.83, and the rank order of these same subjects at post-
therapy was .92. Dymond also reports that the relationship
between the subject 1 s "Q" adjustment score and the rating of
improvement over therapy by the therapist was significant at
better than the .05 level. Finally, Dymond reported (ch. 8)
that a correlation study between the "Q," sort adjustment
score and the Thematic Apperception Test rating gave similar
results, i.e., the TAT records of subjects presenting them-
selves for therapy were judged blindly to be more disturbed
than those of a control group. Over the course of therapy
there was a significant change for the experimental group as
a whole in a positive direction, which did not occur in the
control group over a matched period of time. Dymond reported
that the "Q" sort adjustment scale and the TAT ratings had a
product-moment correlation at pre-therapy of .63 and at post-
therapy of .Ij.7, both of which were significant at better than
the .05 level, showing, according to Dymond, that the two
criteria demonstrated change of the same extent and direction.
Thus from these results it appears that the "Q" sort adjust-
ment scale is a valid and reliable measure for assessing the
general adjustment level of a subject.
Taylor Manifest Anxiety Sc»l fl : The anxiety level of the
subjects In this experiment will be operationally defined by
the Taylor Anxiety Scale (35). The MAS was developed from
items on the MMPI which were judged to be Indicative of
anxiety. The resulting scale was composed of fifty key items
with 175 buffer statements. In a test-retest check on reli-
ability, Hedlund, Farber and Bechtoldt (13) found the
correlation to be .82. Hilgard, Jones and Kaplan (II4.) found
an odd-even reliability of .92. In an eyelid conditioning
experiment, Taylor found a test-retest reliability of .89 (36).
In a validation study of the MAS, Hoyt and Magoon (15)
had experienced counselors make Judgments as to the degree of
manifest anxiety present in clients they had recently seen.
Following these judgments, the subjects were given the Taylor
MAS. It was concluded that there were highly reliable dif-
ferences between scores made by clients judged to be "high
anxious" and those judged to be "low anxious" or "medium
anxious" by the judges. Similar results are reported by
Gleser and Ulett (10) who correlated the Taylor MAS and the
Saslow Screening test with ratings of psychiatrists on anxiety
proneness, and found both to correlate well. The former
correlated .61, while the latter correlated .55 with the
psychiatric rating of anxiety proneness and symptoms of
anxiety and apprehension. Further, in an unpublished thesis
by Lauterbach, as reported by Goodstein (17) > Lauterbach
reported a significant correlation between anxiety scale
scores and psychologists ratings of overt anxiety. However,
the correlation with psychiatrists* ratings was not signifi-
cantly different from zero.
In a study by Buss et al (3), the authors reported that
clinical Judgments of anxiety, apprehension and generally
poor personality structure, correlated .60 with the Taylor
MAS. In addition, the subject 1 s subjective reports of sweating,
flushing, excessive swallowing and palpitation of the heart
correlated .68 with the MAS, while general feelings of tense-
ness correlated .52. In a follow-up by buss (]+), the author
reported that Ss scoring high on an anxiety scale were Judged
to be significantly higher in apprehension, worry, tenseness
and general nervousness. Siegman (31) found the MAS to cor-
relate • 3I4. with a manifest anxiety rating scale, significant
at the .01 level of confidence. Siegman hypothesized that the
low correlation was due to the fact that the Taylor MAS con-
tains many items referring to chronic manifestations of
anxiety. In addition, Siegman found the MAS to correlate
-.72 with scores on a self-esteem scale, also significant at
the .01 confidence limit. These results tend to support the
proposition that a person scoring high on an anxiety scale
will tend to be Judged as manifestly anxious and probably as
having feelings of inadequacy.
Statement of the problem : This study attempted then, to
determine generally, the effects of self-esteem stress upon
the subject's perception of self and others. Because the
anxiety level of the subject has been presumed to have an
effect upon his reactions to stress, the author introduced
anxiety level as a control variable. This study investigated
the relationship between anxiety level and perception of self
and of others, and the effect of the Interaction between
anxiety level and stress upon perception of self and others.
Furthermore, it evaluated the relationship between perception
of self and others. Finally, this study was concerned with
determining whether stress affects perceptions of solf and of
others in a differential manner.
Hypotheses! 1. With regard to the control variable of
anxiety level, this writer tested the null hypothesis that the
level of anxiety would not affect perceptions of self and
others.
2. It was hypothesized that perception of the self would
not be significantly lower in level of adjustment for subjects
who were exposed to self-esteem stress than for subjects who
were not exposed to this stress. The null hypothesis was
taken since the empirical evidence is unclear as to whether
self-esteem stress does in fact lower a person's evaluation
of self (7» 8, 16, 19).
3. The perception of others in terms of their adjustment
would not be significantly lower for subjects who receive
self-esteem stress than for subjects who did not receive this
threat to their self-esteem. Reports of investigations of
this question have given conflicting results (7 f 19).
I4.. With regard to the acceptance of the Rorschach
evaluation, the author tested the null hypothesis that neither
anxiety level nor stress would affect the extent to which a
subject accepted this evaluation.
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METHOD
First, the author would like to describe briefly the experiment.
All subjects had been given the Taylor MAS prior to the actual
experiment. Eighteen subjects were selected from the upper twenty-
five percent level of the scale and eighteen from the lower twenty-
five percent. Eighteen female subjects were given a spurious
personality description, presumably based on their Rorschach test,
indicating that they were very poorly adjusted
. Nino subjects were
high in manifest anxiety level with the other nino subjects low in
manifest anxiety lovel. After reading these personality descriptions,
the eighteen subjects sorted statements first pertaining to themselves
and then to others. These two sorts were modified "Q" sorts. After
they completed the two MQ" sorts, the subjects were advised that their
personality description w«?r,. raise.
Another group of eighteen subjects, nine high and nino low in
manifest anxiety, were also given a spurious personality description,
again ostensibly based on the Rorschach test, which indicated that
the subjects were more or less normal in their personal adjustment.
These subjects followed the procedure of first sorting statements
relating to therasolves and second, relating to others. Upon completion
of these sorts, the subjects were told that their personality descrip-
tions were false.
Subjects : Two groups, each consisting of eighteen subjects were
randomly drawn from the upper and lower twenty-five percent of the
Taylor Manifest /Inxiety Scale distribution, which was administered
to several sections of the introductory psycholo^ classes at the
University of Massachusetts. As a limiting factor, all the
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subjects were female members of these classes. The major
reason for such a limitation in sucject population was to
control for any variation related to sex. An attempt was
made to insure that all thirty-six subjects were free from
environmental stress, as evaluated by an interview and
questionnaire. This additional limitation on the choice of
subjects was introduced to minimize stress not directly
under experimental control.
Procedure : Level of anxiety was operationally defined
by scores on the Taylor MAS. As stated above, this was the
initial basis for selection of subjects.
The thirty-six subjects selected to serve in this ex-
periment met for two sessions.
1. In the first session, all Ss were tested with the
group Rorschach test. These protocols were evaluated by two
clinical psychologists as an additional measure to insure that
the subjects chosen would be relatively able to tolerate
self-esteem stress. Any subjects found unsuitable were not
included in the experiment.
2. At the end of the first session with the group
Rorschach test, the group was told that their Rorschach records
were to be evaluated by the experimenter and other clinical
psychologists as a rating of their "level of adjustment" in
order that he might select some of them for a future experiment.
The experimenter then told the subjects that these "confidential
records" would be made available to those subjects chosen for
the second experimental session, and that they would be dis-
tributed at that session.
3. The "high anxious" and "low anxious" groups were each
randomly divided into two additional groups—an experimental
and control group. Within two weeks following the administra-
tion of the group Rorschach test, the thirty-six subjects were
recalled in groups of approximately ten subjects each.
Ij.. In the second session, each subject received her
"confidential evaluation" of her Rorschach test which was
described as "a measure of your general adjustment". The pre-
determined experimental group received a typewritten negative
evaluation of their adjustment (Appendix A), while the control
group received a neutral evaluation (Appendix B),
5. Following a short period in which each subject was
given time to read her "evaluation", the subjects were re-
quested to perform the adjustment Q, sort developed by Rogers
and Dyraond (25), in which the individual sorted seventy-four
statements according to whether she felt they were "like me"
or "unlike me". This sort was also performed by each subject
indicating whether the same seventy-four statements were like
or unlike the "average" person.
Instead of requiring a sort on a scale of nine as did
Dyraond, this study required a sort on a scale of six. The
reason for this slight innovation is that unlike Dyraond, this
study was not concerned with direct correlations of the k sort
for which the scale of nine was needed. The scale of six was
required here in order to insure against any "set" which the
subject might acquire toward positive or negative sorting.
The adjustment scores for the Q sorts were determined according
to Dyraond^ method.
27
Throughout both experimental sessions, the experimenter
was unaware of the subject's manifest anxiety level. In order
to minimize differential treatment of the two groups, both
experimental and control subjects were included in each session
of the experiment proper. Also, the experimenter made minimal
contact with the subjects until the experiment was completed.
6. Following the conclusion of the experiment, the sub-
jects were given a complete explanation of the experimental
procedure plus its purpose.
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RESULTS
Means and standard deviations of "Q» adjustment scores
for each of the four treatment groups are presented in Table
1. P tests indicated the variances to be significantly dif-
ferent from each other and thus heterogeneous. Transformations
of the data by means of the square roots of the raw scores
and also the use of the logs of these scores failed to reduce
the heterogeneity; therefore, the raw data were used with the
knowledge that the heterogeneity would require a higher level
of significance in the interpretation of the results. In ac-
cordance with the suggestion of Lindquist (19) the "apparent"
level of significance will be raised from .05 to .01 in order
to make allowance for the heterogeneous variance.
Analysis of variance (2) was used to determine whether
anxiety level and self-esteem stress had any effect on the
perceptions of self and others (Table 2). The first analysis
indicates that anxiety level as measured by the Taylor MAS did
not have a significant effect on the combined perceptions of
self and others. The second analysis similarly indicates that
self-esteem stress failed to have a significant effect on the
combined self and ot her perceptions as measured by the "Q"
adjustment scale. The interactions of anxiety level and self-
esteem stress with adjustment scores were likewise insignificant.
The second section of Table 2 contains the within-groups
analysis of variance which indicates the effects of stress and
anxiety level on the manner in which the subject perceived his
own adjustment as compared to the way in which he perceived
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the adjustment of others. The first analysis indicates that,
in general, subjects perceived others as being better adjusted
than themselves, regardless of anxiety level or whether or not
they were subjected to self-esteem stress. This perception of
general superiority of the adjustment of others over self was
significant at the ,05 level of confidence. In view of the
heterogeneous variance, however, this level of significance
has been raised to the .01 level. Hence, this P of ij.,27 is
not significant and therefore must be regarded only as a trend.
Neither anxiety level nor self-esteem stress were associated
with any significant differences between adjustment scores
for self and adjustment scores for others. Interactions of
anxiety level and stress did not produce any significant dif-
ferences between adjustment scores for self and for others.
In view of the fact that the analyses of variance of the
main treatment effects and their interactions failed to reach
significance, the treatment effects were not broken down into
their simple effects.
The analysis of variance was used to determine whether the
subjects in this experiment accepted the bogus evaluation of
their Rorschach protocols. This analysis is summarized in
Table 3 together with the means and standard deviations of
these ratings in Table J|. Neither anxiety level, self-esteem
stress nor their interactions produced significant differences
in these ratings. These analyses, plus the means and standard
deviations Indicate that all groups accepted the evaluations
equally well. This analysis does not permit rejection of the
null hypothesis that anxiety level and stress would have no
effect on the subject 1 s acceptance of the stress to her self-esteem.
Table 1
Means and standard deviations of "Q" adjustment scores
for self and others
Self Other
Mean S.D. Mean S. D.
Stress HA 50.88 15. 81 59.66 8.83
LA 55.i|4 11.52 60.22 5.78
Non stress HA 51^.66 8.72 58.88 5.I4.9
LA 61.11 7.99 59.88 8. 61
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Table 2
Analysis of Variance of the effects of Self-esteemStress and Anxiety level on the "Q" Adjustment scores
for Self and Others
Source df ss MS r
Be tween-Sub jec ts
(A) Anxiety
(S) Stress
AS
error (b)
Total
Within-Subjects
1
1
1
32
35
177.314-
78.12
6.13
3600.23
3861.82
177.314-
78.12
6.13
112.50
1.57
.69
.05
(Adj) Adjustment
A Adj
S Adj
AS Adj
error (w)
Total
1
1
1
1
32
36
308.31+
100.36
125.36
2.33
2307.ll
28^3.50
308. 3I4.
100.3o
125.36
2.33
72.09
IJ..27*
1.39
1.73
.03
Table 3
Analysis of Variance of Subject's Ratings of
Rorschach Test ^valuations
Source df
(A) Anxiety 1
(S) Stress 1
AS 1
(between subjects) (3)
error (w) 32
Total 35
SS MS P
1.36 1.36 .30
8.03 8.03 1.81
1.36 1.36 .30
10.75
H|l.56
152.31
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Table 1+
Means and Standard Deviations of Subject's Ratings of
Rorschach Test Evaluations
Stress Non-stress
Mean S.D. Mean S.D,
HA 7.77 2,07 8.33 .97
LA 7.00 1.77 8.33 1.1*
In order to determine whether there was any correlation
between how well the subject accepted the Rorschach evaluation
and the difference between her self and other adjustment
scores, the Kendall Rank Correlation Coefficients (30) were
computed for each of the four groups (Table 5). The cor-
relation for the HA stress group was .68 which is significant
at the .01 level of confidence. The correlations for the other
three groups were not significant.
The correlation of .68 for the HA stressed group indicates
that for this group of subjects, the degree to which a subject
accepted the evaluation of her Rorschach protocol may be
related to the difference between her estimate of the "average"
person's adjustment and her own adjustment. That is, the
more a subject accepted the stress evaluation, the poorer
was her own perceived adjustment as compared to her perception
of the adjustment of others.
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Table 5
Kendall Hank Correlation Coefficients Between Differences
Between Self and Other Scores and the Subject's Rating
of the Rorschach Evaluation
Subject group r
Stress HA .68*
LA
.33
Non-stress HA
.03
LA •26
•^Significant at .01 level.
I
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DISCUSSION
The finding that anxiety level failed to have an effect
upon the subjects 1 perceptions of selves and others does not
permit rejection of the null hypothesis that this control
variable has no significant effect. This result is in partial
contradiction to the findings of Doris and Sarason (S) who
reported that for one order of test item presentation, high
anxious subjects tended to blame solves more than others in
a "forced" failure situation, A similar result, however, was
not found in a second study by Doris and Sarason in which the
order of test item presentation was reversed and the order of
pass -fail was changed. The authors concluded that one pro-
cedure was more frustrating than the other and that significant
differences between high anxious and low anxious subjects
occurred in the more frustrating procedure. It is possible
that significant differences might have been found in this
study had its procedure been more frustrating. It may be
also that the perception of the general adjustment level of
self and of others is less susceptible to change than Is a
subjects blame assignment following a transitory failure stress.
Like anxiety level, self-esteem stress failed to have a
significant effect on the perceptions of self and others. The
Interaction of anxiety level and self-esteem stress was also
insignificant. Hence, controlling for anxiety level in itself,
does not add any precision to the investigation of the effects
of self-esteem stress upon the subject's perception of himself
or of others.
The within-groups analysis of variance found in the
second half of Table 2, indicates that the subjects of this
experiment, regardless of anxiety level or of self-esteem
stress, tended to perceive others as somewhat better adjusted
than themselves. Due to the marked heterogeneity of the
scores, this result, which does not reach significance at
the .05 level, can be regarded only as a trend.
The analysis of the interaction of anxiety level with the
difference between self and other scores was not significant,
indicating that the trend to perceive others as better adjusted
than selves was not related to anxiety level. In other words,
a subject's level of anxiety has little or no effect upon dif-
ferences between the perceptions of self and the perceptions
of others.
Self-esteem stress likewise did not interact with dif-
ferences between the perceptions of self and others to produce
significant results. This indicates that self-esteem stress
also, did not affect any differences between perceptions of
self and others.
The interaction of anxiety level and self-esteem stress
with differences between perceptions of self and others were
also not significant, indicating a conclusion similar to the
two above.
These results are in general agreement with those of
Kates (16) who found that self-esteem stress failed to increase
the subject's disturbance value of annoying social situations.
They agree also with those of Diller (7) who was unable to
decrease overt ratings of intelligence or personality traits
by subjecting subjects to self-esteem stress. The latter'
s
report of possible conscious defensiveness on the overt scale
for the stressed trait, may be a partial explanation for the
lack of significance in the results of this study, i.e., the
stressed groups may have defended against any lowering of their
self-esteem.
The failure to find significant differences between
stressed and non-stressed groups is in contradiction to the
findings of Levanway (19), who reported significant increases
in evaluations of adjustment of both self and others after
self-esteem stress. It is possible that changes similar to
those found by Levanway did in fact occur within stressed
subjects in this study, but not to such an extent as to be
reflected in the analysis, i.e., the stressed groups may have
defended against lowered self evaluations to the extent that
they reported heightened self perceptions which resulted in
adjustment scores which were comparable to the control groups
who were not expected to change.
Another possible explanation for the apparent contra-
diction between these results and those of Levanway may be
found in procedural differences. Levanway utilized a method
which was more apt to point up any changes in perceptions of
self and others following stress than was used in this study.
In Levanway' s study, all Ss were administered the three
measures as a group in the before-stress phase, and then
following self-esteem stress, were administered the same
three measures a second time, this time individually. The
fact that each S received each measure twice has the advantage
that any change in self or other perceptions are immediately
evident and possible magnified.
A disadvantage, however, is also evident, i.e., the pos-
sibility of practice effects, which may result in altered
scores from what would have been found after stress had S
not received the same measure prior to stress. This study,
while controlling for practice effects, was not as precise
as Levanway 1 s in observing differences in the individuals
self perceptions after stress. The emphasis here was on
differences between groups, i.e., stress and non-stress
groups; and, in effect, the two studies were measuring dif-
ferent factors. Levanway measured changes within the indi-
vidual subject and this study measured differences between
treatment groups.
Another possible reason for differences in results is
suggested by the fact that Levanway used a relatively unknown
personality measure as his source of self-esteem stress, i.e.,
the pattern of words recalled by the subject; this study
utilized a personality measure which has received a certain
amount of popular attention and which may have affected the
manner in which the subjects reacted, i.e., either to increase
or decrease their attempts to deny the validity of the stress.
An additional procedural difference between this study
and that of Levanway should be noted. Subjects in this study
were given a written evaluation of their Rorschach protocols.
This written report served as the self-esteem stress in the
case of the stress group, and was read by the subject as a
a member of a group and with no direct contact between the
experimenter and the subject. Levanway, on the other hand,
administered the self-esteem stress orally and individually
to each subject. This suggests two further areas of study;
first, what effect will a written presentation of stress have
as compared to an orally presented stress, the latter case in
which the subject is face to face with the stressing individual
while in the former, he is more or less removed from the
stressing person. Secondly, what is the effect of being
stressed while a member of a group of persons receiving an
unknown evaluation of themselves as compared to receiving
stress individually without the knowledge that others are
also being evaluated.
As suggested above in the discussion of the apparent
contradiction between these results and those of Doris and
Sarason (8), it may be that the treatments of anxiety level
and self-esteem stress combine to produce an effect in a
subject even though this is not evident from these results.
Possibly, the tests were not adequate for revealing changes
due to stress. This suggestion is also based on the cor-
relation of .68 for the HA stress group between the differences
between their self and other scores and the extent to which
they accepted the stressful Rorschach evaluation. This cor-
relation was significant at the .01 level of confidence, while
similar correlations for the other three groups failed to be
significant.
There appear to be several important aspects of this
finding. First, although the four treatment groups did not
differ significantly from each other in the extent to which
they accepted the Rorschach evaluation, there was nevertheless
a range from very high acceptance to low acceptance within
each group. Second, the HA stress subjects, as a group, tended
to perceive a greater difference between the adjustment of self
and the adjustment of others than did the other three groups.
The correlation of .68 for the HA stress group between this
difference and the subject's degree of acceptance of the
Rorschach evaluation indicates that the subjects of this group
who gave the highest rating to the evaluation, also saw others
as more adequately adjusted compared to themselves. Subjects
of this group who accepted the evaluation less completely did
not perceive such a difference between their adjustment and
that of others. Whether or not a HA stressed person reacts
differently from others may depend on how well the person
accepts the stress to her self-esteem. If she should accept
this as being correct and valid, then she might be expected
to perceive others as better adjusted than herself, than she
would if she did not accept the evaluation.
It should be noted that a cause-effect relationship is
by no means being suggested for this relationship. The reverse
is equally possible, i.e., a person who perceives herself as
rather poorly adjusted, may tend to be more acceptant of a
negative, or stressful evaluation of her adjustment than would
a person who perceives herself as being well adjusted.
This question of the subject's acceptance of the self-
esteem stress has been largely overlooked in the literature.
Lazarus et al (19) point out the importance of the subject's
motivation to maintain his present level of self-esteem. The
question of acceptance by the subject of self-esteem stress
goes a point further, that is, it considers the motivation of
the subject. That is, it does not appear sufficient to stress
an individual with respect to his self-esteem alone. It is
equally important to know how much he values, or is motivated
to maintain, his present level of self-esteem. If he is
highly motivated to maintain his present level of self-esteem,
he may not accept it, or if he does accept it, he will be more
disturbed by this stress to his self-esteem than someone who
has the same level of self-esteem but who is not so highly
motivated to maintain it.
A similar suggestion is made by Pey (9), who found that
subjects who are less accepted by others tend to be less
accepting of others. Pey reports that this re jection-pro jecti
trend, as he calls it, was by no means a pure one and he feels
that many other variables are involved. Pey suggests that the
motivating factors are not controlled when we merely ask an
individual if he accepts himself. His attempt, therefore,
like that of this study, to test Rogerian theory was not
successful, possibly because of this question of subject
motivation.
Once again, a cause-effect relationship is not being
suggested. Two major possibilities, however, appear to be
evident. It may be that a HA person who accepts a stressful
evaluation of his adjustment, will tend to be affected by this
so that he regards himself as being poorly adjusted relative
to others. It is equally possible however, that a HA person
who regards himself as being poorly adjusted relative to
others, will tend to accept a negative evaluation of his
adjustment level. This appears to be a promising area for
future research.
SUMMARY
The present study investigated the effects of two
variables, manifest anxiety and self-esteem stress, and
their interactions upon the perceptions of self and others.
Two levels of these variables were used in a 2 x 2 x 2 mixed
analysis of variance design with nine undergraduate female
subjects in each cell.
Level of anxiety was operationally defined by scores on
the Taylor Manifest Anxiety Scale. This was administered to
ij.00 subjects and served as the initial basis for selection of
subjects, i.e., subjects were drawn from the upper and lower
twenty-five percent limits of this scale. Following the
selection of subjects from these limits, certain subjects
were excluded due to personal or administrative reasons.
Following this selection, thirty-six subjects were included
in the experiment.
The thirty-six subjects selected to serve in the experiment
met for two sessions; in the first of which all were tested
with the group Rorschach test. In the second session, the
subjects performed a "Q" adjustment sort for themselves and
for others.
At the end of the first session, the subjects were in-
formed that their Rorschach records were to be evaluated by
clinical psychologists for their "level of adjustment" in
order that the experimenter might select some of them for a
future experiment. The subjects were also told at that time
that each would be given a "confidential" report of the
psychologist,,, findings. The "high anxiety" and "low anxiety"
groups were each randomly divided into a stress, or experimental
group, and a control group.
In the second session, a negative and neutral evaluation,
both of which were bogus, served as the stress and control
evaluations respectively.
Perceptions of self and others were obtained by means of
an adjustment «Q" sort, in which the subjects sorted seventy-
four statements on a "like-me"-llunlike-me», six point scale
from
-3 to +3. The sort was also performed by each subject
indicating whether the same seventy-four statements were like
or unlike the "average" person.
Following the experiment proper, each subject was informed
of the nature and purpose of the experiment in order to insure
that no subject would leave the experiment with any incorrect
impressions of her adjustment as a result of the experiment.
The results indicated that in this experiment, anxiety
level and self-esteem stress did not have effect on the per-
ception of the adjustment of self and others. Neither anxiety
level, self-esteem stress nor their interactions had significant
effect on these perceptions.
A correlation for the high anxiety stress group, between
self and other adjustment scores and the subjects rating of
acceptance of the Rorschach interpretation, was significant
at the .01 level of confidence. This correlation for the high
anxious stress group indicated that subjects in this group who
accepted the bogus evaluation of their Rorschach protocol,
also tended to perceive themselves as more poorly adjusted
relative to others than did subjects who did not accept the
bogus evaluation as highly. Similar correlations for the
other three groups in this experiment were not significant.
The importance of the above correlation for future
research was discussed in the previous section in terras of
the motivation of the subject. It was concluded that while
anxiety and stress did not appear to affect perceptions of
self and others, either singly or in combination, it may be
that they combine to have an effect when the subject's ac-
ceptance of the stress is taken into account.
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APPENDIX A
Stress Evaluation
An analysis of your Rorschach indicates that you are afairly average person but have important shortcomings. Youare not doing as well as you could intellectually due to someemotional difficulties. This is, of course, unfortunatebecause you really have good ability. At times, this makesyou feel inferior to come of your classmates, angry withyourself, and envious. You will frequently lose patience,
end up doing things in a slipshod manner, and then feel
moody and irritable. You also avoid competing with others
and become distressed ever failures instead of taking themin stride. For example, you feel anxious and insecure when
meeting important people, taking examinations, and so on.
In such situations, you are always anxious about making agood impression.
Emotionally, you get along well with other people, but
you do not have many really close relationships. You have a
distinct need to have other people like you and admire you,
but you often feel an insufficient amount of attention is
given you. This occurs both in your family and with your
friends, and leaves you feeling lonely and moody. You thus
avoid being alone with nothing to do. Unfortunately, you
have spoiled a number of significant relationships by saying
or doing the wrong thing, or by not being sensitive to the
needs of the other person involved. Part of this is due to
the fact that you feel very antagonistic to quite a few
people. This makes you anxious because you feel guilty and
vulnerable to rebuke. As a result, you try to control your
feelings so that they will not show through, and have become
oversensitive to critical remarks supposedly directed
against you. Your sexual adjustment is also a definite
problem which is difficult to resolve. Your Rorschach sug-
gests severe conflict in this area.
I would not worry about the above emotional difficulties
but they do cut down on what you can accomplish and isolate
you from many potential relationships. Instead of doing
things, you tend to daydream. You avoid volunteering for
many activities because of possible failure and ridicule.
You find it difficult to concentrate at times, and frequently
have doubts as to whether or not you have made the right
decision. Some of the above patterns should be modified
if you are to get the most enjoyment out of life and make
an adequate social and sexual adjustment.
APPENDIX B
Neutral Evaluation
f1*1^" of Jour Rorschach record Indicates that yourMotional, social and intellectual adjustment is similar tothat of the average, normally adjusted individual of your ageand intelligence. Apparently, you are aware to the samedegree as the normal individual, of the social and cultural
standards essential for adaptation to your environment.
As you may know, this test is primarily a means of
evaluating the degree of your emotional disturbance. With
reference to your personality and characteristics, you do
not manifest any sign of emotional disturbance or of social
maladjustment. On the other hand, this does not mean thatyou are very well adjusted or that you apparently possess
any really disturbing personality characteristics. Finally,
your emotional life probably has the same number of ups and
downs as that of the average adjusted individual of your ace
and intelligence.
APPENDIX G
Stress Questionnaire
Please indicate if anything unusually distressful hasoccurred to you within the past 1-2 months. To indicate this,
write either "yes" or no" at the bottom of your test answer
S
S
e
fJ' *l
f y?u answer "yes", indicate the number (or numbers)
«•.? i
m ( °r items) whlch aPPlies to you. Your responses
will, of course, be confidential, being used only for researchpurposes.
Specifically, has any of the following occurred:
1. Illness or accident in the family
2. Separation of parents
3. Very severe family quarrel
2j.« Separation from fiancee or steady boy-friend
5. Illness or physical upset to yourself within the
past 2-3 days
6. Anything else which has you particularly upset at
the present time.
APPENDIX D
Instructions
Sort these cards to describe yourself as you see yourself
^
d
^ 1 £
r0m th°Se that are least ^ke 7™ t0 those that arlmost like you.
Sort the cards that are like you so that under 3 (verymuch like-me) you will place two cards; under 2 (moderatelylike-me you will place ten cards; and under 1 (a littlelike -me) you will place twenty-five cards.
Sort the cards that are unlike you in the same way thatyou sort the cards that are like you.
Sort the cards that are unlike you so that under
-3(very much unlike-rae) you will place two cards; under -2(moderately unlike
-me ) you will place ten cards; and under
-1 (a little unlike-rae) you will place twenty-five cards.
Instructions
Sort these cards to describe the average person as you
see that person today, from those that are least like the
average person to those that are most like the average person.
Sort the cards that are like the average person so that
under 3 (very much like -the average -person) you will place
two cards; under 2 (moderately like-the average-person) you
will place ten cards; and under 1 (a little like-the average-
person) you will place twenty-five cards.
Sort the cards that are un-like-the average -person in the
same way that you sort the cards that are like the average
person.
Sort the cards that are unlike -the average -person so that
under
-3 (very much unlike-the average -person) you will place
two cards; under -2 (moderately unlike-the average-person) you
will place ten cards; under -1 (a little unlike-the average-
person) you will place twenty-five cards.
APPENDIX E
Rorschach Rating Questionnaire
0n the graph below please rate how well the interpre-tation of your Rorschach record describes you.
As you see there are ten blocks on the graph, from 1to 10. A check in block 1 would indicate that you feel theinterpretation was totally inaccurate and totally unlikeyou, while a check in block 10 would indicate that the inter-pretation was perfectly correct and exactly like you. Place
a check in one of the blocks from 1 to 10 to Indies te how
accurate (or inaccurate) the evaluation was in describing you.
i A A A A A A A A Ao /
^tally Perfectly
inaccurate correct
Now that you have rated how well the interpretation of
your Rorschach describes you, please write below your feelings
and thoughts about this interpretation. If you need additional
room, you are free to write on the reverse side of this paper.
Please understand that this description of your feelings will
be kept anonymous, therefore, do not put any identifying marks
of any kind on your paper. We are not interested in the
individual's answers as such; we are instead interested in
how well the Rorschach interpretation agrees with how people
feel about themselves.
APPENDIX F
Q adjustment scores for self and others and subject's
rating of Rorschach interpretation of "high anxious" andlow anxious", stressed and non-stressed subjects
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High anxious
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60
38
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58
52
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High anxious
Rating Self
9 55
10 62
3 62
7 68
9 66
9
8
6 30
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Low anxious
Other Rating
Non-stress
58
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&
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S8
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Low anxious
8
5
i
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9
7
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Other Rating Self Other Rating
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